LnumITE LIABILITY COMPANIES AND O1TING-OuT OF
LIABILIT: A NEW STANDARD FOR FIDucIARY Dunw?
The limited liability company (LLC) is an exciting new entity that
may soon replace the need for many traditional business forms. In particular, the close corporation, general partnership, 2 and limited partnership may shortly become relics of the past.' The popularity of an LLC
is largely due to what this versatile new business form has to offer. 5
Most notably, members may actively participate in the management of the
LLC without exposing themselves to personal liability and ma6y still elect
to be treated as a "partnership" for federal taxation purposes. With this
new progression, however, comes the need to re-examine the traditional
duties that participants owe to the entity and to other participants.
Should this increased flexibility create correspondingly higher duties?
What standard of accountability should the courts and legislatures demand?
To respond to these queries, it is necessary to examine the preeminent framework for defining the obligations and responsibilities of participants in the world of business associations-fiduciary duties. One of
the main concerns of any shareholder, partner, or member of an organization is liability. 7 This is, therefore, an abundantly relevant, and often
1 See infra Part II.C.2 (providing an overview of the close corporation).
2 See infra Part II.C.3 (providing an overview of partnership law).
3 See infra Part II.C.3 (providing an overview of partnership
law).
4 See Robert B. Thompson, The Taming of Limited Liability Companies,
66 U.
COLO. L. REv. 921, 921 (1995).
5 See infra notes 22-30 and accompanying text (discussing the attributes
of LLCs).
6 See 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEiN & ROBERT R. KEATmNOE, RIaSTEIN AND
KEATmGE ON
LIMrTm LIABILITy COMPANIES §§ 1.04, 3.05, at 1-3, 3-6 (1996); Claire Moore Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized: Fidiuciary Duties Under the Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REv. 417, 426 (1995); Wayne M. Gazur, The Limited Liability Company Experiment: Unlimited Flexibility, Uncertain Role, 58 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 135, 137 (1995); Sandra K. Miller, What Remedies Should Be Made Available to
the Dissatisfied Participantin a Limited Liability Company?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 465,
476 (1994) [hereinafter What Remedies Should Be Made Available]; Sandra K. Miller,
What Standards of Conduct Should Apply to Members and Managers of Limited Liability
Companies?, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 21, 36 (1994) [hereinafter What Standards of Con-

duct Should Apply].

7 See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 1.04, at 1-3. The main attraction
of
the LLC is the shield of liability it provides to its members. See 1 id. While all limited
liability statutes afford members protection from the obligations and liabilities of the LLC,
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dispositive factor to consider when determining what type of entity to
select. 8 Because LLCs are so new, there are no clear cut criteria for delineating the duties and obligations of the members and managers of an
LLC.9 In particular, characterization of this fiduciary relationship and,
subsequently, the extent to which the parties may contract out of any
such obligations, 10 remains largely without definition.11 This uncertainty
leaves many attorneys in a sort of quandary when attempting to discern
any potential restrictions that may 12infringe upon the extent to which the
parties may tailor their agreements.
Examination of this problem also presents two unique difficulties.
First, while a Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) does
exist, state statutes have generally adopted divergent approaches on the
issue of fiduciary responsibilities and have not been very receptive to the
ULLCA.1 3 Accordingly, to assist in formulating a baseline for analysis,
this Comment will explore the statutory and decisional law in two
states-Delaware and New York. The selection of these states is based
upon their unique position in the sphere of corporate law. Delaware, often referred to as the incorporation capital of the world,1 4 has a good deal
limited liability will not safeguard against the members' own negligence, to certain degrees. See 1 id.
8 See I id. §§ 2.01, 2.02, at 2-2 to -3. Liability is also a relevant concern for
jurisdictional choice, and is consistent with the Professor Cary's coined terminology, the
"race to the bottom," where states contend for "business" by enacting pro-management
environments. See Carl Samuel Bjerre, Note, Evaluating the New Director Exculpation
Statutes, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 786, 786 (1988). A prime example is Delaware's director
exculpation statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1996). After Delaware adopted this provision, numerous states followed, using Delaware's language almost
word for word. See Bjerre, supra, at 786 & n.3.
9 See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 9.01, at 9-1 to -2. While
there has
been no real evolution of LLC case law to date, these fiduciary responsibilities will surely
take shape from the already developed law surrounding partnerships and corporations.
See l id. at 9-2. To what degree remains the question. See l id.
10 See 1 "id. § 9.04, at 9-9. "The critical question is not whether consent or waiver
ever will be enforced in the LLC, but how extensively it will be enforced. There is no
developed case law ... on this issue." 1 id.
11 See What Standards of Conduct Should Apply, supra note 6, at 28. There
has been
a lack of focus on the interrelation between the duties of members/managers and the
LLC. See id. Many articles have instead preferred to focus on comparing the LLC to
other business structures. See id. at 27.
12 See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879 (noting the difficulties of pinpointing the exact nature of
the fiduciary obligation and arguing that a cookie cutter approach of applying contract law
as ageneral overlay is oftentimes insufficient by itself).
I See Dickerson, supra note 6, at 418 & n.5 (1995); infra notes 224-38 (discussing
the ULLCA's statutory method of structuring fiduciary duties). For a broad overview of
the ULLCA, see generally Dickerson, supra note 6.
14 See Edward M. McNally & John H. Small, Alternative Entities: The Multiple
Choices Available in Delaware, 14 DEL. LAw. 27, 27 (Fall 1994). As one commentator
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of experience in handling corporate law issues and often approaches these
matters in an innovative fashion.1 5 New York, on the other hand, is a
prime hub for activity because of its status as the leading center for finance and commerce, and it is subsequently where many parties turn because of its sophisticated administration of commercial law.16 A second
obstacle in the study of LLCs is the distinct lack of decisional law.
Hence, much of the material covered in this Comment will be drawn
from the LLC's predecessors-the corporation and partnership.
This Comment provides a cohesive framework for addressing the issue of fiduciary obligations in the context of an LLC and ultimately proposes a workable standard of review for the courts. Part I of this Comment provides a general overview of the characteristics and attributes of
LLCs and then examines the statutory framework of LLCs in New York
and Delaware. 17 Part H1 endeavors to unravel the current treatment of fiduciary duties by examining how the New York and Delaware LLC statutes and decisional law address fiduciary relationships. In exploring the
case law, this Part primarily focuses on three related entities and their
interpretations of fiduciary standards: (1) the corporation; (2) the close
corporation; and (3) the partnership. 18 Finally, Part III of this Comment
proposes a cohesive and workable standard of review for evaluating the
extent to which parties may define their agreement in the LLC arena. 9
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE LLC STATUTES OF NEW YORK AND DELAWARE
AND RELATED ISSUES

A. The Nature of the Beast: A GeneralLook at LLCs
LLCs are a hybrid of sorts, inheriting some characteristics from
corporate as well as partnership models.20 One commentator defined the
remarked in an article comparing numerous forms of business entities, Delaware is
"known as the home of the corporation." See id.
15 See Brad Karp, The LitigationAngle in Drafling Commercial Contracts at 39, 5758 & n.28 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7109, 1995).

16 See Joseph D. Becker et. al., Proposalfor Mandatory Enforcement of Governing

Law Clauses and Related Clauses in Significant Commercial Agreements at 199, 201
(PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4485, 1995).
17 See infra notes 20-75 and accompanying text (illustrating the basic framework and

structure of LLCs).

18 See infra notes 76-202 and accompanying text (examining relational obligations

commensurate with other business forms).
19 See infra notes 203-74 and accompanying text (suggesting a new standard of review for determining the extent to which participants in an LLC may opt out of fiduciary

oblievions).
See Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of a
Race Between the States, But Heading Where?, 45 SYAucsE L. REv. 1193, 1198 (1995);
What Remedies Should Be Made Available, supra note 6, at 473-76; What Standards of
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LLC as a "noncorporate business in which all of the members have limited liability, in the absence of personal guarantees, and in which the
2
members can, and frequently do, actively participate in management." 1
In certain respects, this unique form of entity reflects the "best of both
worlds.

"22

From their corporate forefathers 3LLC have secured the protection
of limited liability for their members. Logistically, however, this relatively new breed of organization often functions very much like a partnership. 24 First, just as limited partnership agreements delineate the governance of a limited partnership's operations, "limited liability companv
agreements" command and regulate the inner workings of the LLC.
Conduct Should Apply, supra note 6, at 32-36. For a general overview of the nature and
characteristics of LLCs, see generally Thomas Earl Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (PartOne), 37 S.D. L. REV. 44 (1992);
Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, Bus. LAw., Feb. 1992, at 375; Jimmy G. McLaughlin, Commentary, The Limited
Liability Company: A Prime Choicefor Professionals,45 ALA. L. Riv. 231 (1993).
21 1 RmSTEIN & KEATINE, supra note 6, § 1.02, at 1-2. Ribstein suggests that three
primary distinctions between the LLC and the corporation render the LLC noncorporate:
First, LLCs usually are not bound by the restrictions as to finance that
historically have bound the corporate form ....
Second, unlike corporations, LLCs are not bound by special requirements for management by a
board of directors or equivalent body [and] [t]hird, LLCs are designed to
avoid two-tier corporate tax treatment.
1 id. (footnotes omitted).
22 See Marybeth Bosko, Note, The Best of Both Worlds: The
Limited Liability Company, 54 OHO ST. LJ. 175, 198 (1993); see also Goforth, supra note 20, at 1217
(explaining that "an LLC is an entity which takes many of the most desirable attributes of
theartnership and combines them with the most desirable features of the corporation").
See Goforth, supra note 20, at 1217; What Remedies Should Be Made Available,
supra note 6, at 466; What Standards of Conduct Should Apply, supra note 6, at 32. One
of the principle advantages that LLCs offer over a partnership structure is limited liability
for all members, not just the limited partners. See Gazur, supra note 6, at 137.
24 See sources cited supra note 20. The strong resemblance to the partnership
form
may stem from the fact that, absent the LLC option, the parties would have selected a
partnership or close corporation format. See Gazur, supra note 6, at 135. The ideology
behind the LLC is to furnish limited liability in a noncorporate manner. See 1 RIsTmaN
& KEATINOE, supra note 6, § 1.03, at 1-2 to -3.
25 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (Supp. 1996);
N.Y. LIMITED LiAraITY COMPANY LAw § 417 (McKinney 1997). Different states handle the "operating
agreement" in different manners. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (Supp.
1996); N.Y. LIMrTED LIABILrrY COMPANY LAw § 417 (McKinney 1997). For example,
New York's § 417(a) requires that the members:
shall adopt a written operating agreement that contains any provisions not
inconsistent with the law or its articles of organization relating to (i) the
business of the limited liability company, (i) the conduct of its affairs and

(iii) the rights, powers, preferences, limitations or responsibilities of its
members, managers, employees or agents, as the case may be.
N.Y. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LAW § 417(a) (McKinney 1997) (emphases added).
While New York mandates a written operating agreement, see id., Delaware has no spe-
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Second, similar to the partnership model, an LLC's structure allows for
members to actively participate in the daily operations of the business. 26
Third, an LLC member's interest typically lacks a public market 27 and
the LLC operating agreement generally restricts transferability. Y8 Finally, and perhaps the initial propelling force behind the development and
popularity of this
entity, is the ability of LLCs to opt for taxation as a
"partnership." 29 This advantageous tax status and the veil of limited liability are generally hailed as the preeminent features of the LLC.3°
cific provision relating to the governing agreement and does not mandate that the members adopt a "limited liability company agreement." See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18101(7) (Supp. 1997). Instead, title 6, § 18-101(7) of the Delaware Code merely defines
"limited liability company agreement" as a "written agreement of the members as to the
affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its business." Id.
26 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1996); N.Y. LIMITED
LTABIULTY
COMPANY LAW § 401(a) (McKinney 1997) (-Unless the articles of organization provides
for management of the limited liability company by a manager or managers or a class or
classes of managers, management of the limited liability company shall be vested in ias
members who shall manage the limited liability company in accordance with this chapter... ." (emphasis added)). Title 6, § 18-402 of the Delaware Code provides:
Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, the
management of a limited liability company shall be vested in its members in
proportion to the then current percentage or other interest of members in
the profits of the limited liability company owned by all the members ... provided however, that if a limited liability company agreement
provides for the management... by a manager, the management of the
limited liability company, to the extent so provided, shall be vested in the
manager who shall be chosen by the members in the manner provided in
the limited liability company agreement.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
27 See What Remedies Should Be Made Available, supra note 6, at 473
& n.21; What
Standardsof Conduct Should Apply, supra note 6, at 34 & n.26. LLCs are privately held
to avoid taxation as a corporation. See What Remedies Should Be Made Available, supra
note 6, at 473 & n.21; What Standards of Conduct Should Apply, supra note 6, at 34 &
n.26.
28 See Ronold P. Platner, Limited Liabiliy Companies Are Increasingly Popular, 47
TAX'N FOR Accr. 364, 367 (1991) (observing that when drafting an LLC operating
agreement most attorneys focus on negating continuity of life and free transferability).
Generally, an LLC's operating agreement will greatly restrict transferability to avoid potential classification as a 'corporation" for tax purposes.
See id.
A typical nontransferability clause reads as follows:
Unless the unanimous written consent of the... Members is obtained, no
Member shall sell, gift, assign, pledge or otherwise transfer or encumber
("Transfer") all or any part of his or her Membership Interest, or assign
any of his or her rights or delegate the performance of any of his or her
obligations under this Agreement, and any attempt by any Member to make
such Transfer, or to make any such assignment of rights or delegation of
performance of obligations, shall be invalid and ineffective.
Battle Fowler New York Long Form LLC Operating Agreement at 19 (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter BF Operating Agreement].
29 See Dickerson, supra note 6, at 426; see also Goforth, supra note 20, at 1199-206
(tracing the development of LLC legislation and discussing the Internal Revenue Service's
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As noted above, one of the predominant forces behind the LLC is
"partnership" status under the Internal Revenue Code (Code).31 Prior to
the recent Code amendments that allow this election, 32 members often
expended a good deal of energy shaping their LLC agreement to comply
with the Code's classification requirements.33 Under the prior Code
regulations, the LLC was not permitted to have more corporate than noncorporate characteristics. 34 Although there were six corporate characteristics, 35 only the following four characteristics were relevant in the con-

text of an LLC: (1) continuity of life; (2) centralized management; (3)
limited liability; and (4) free transferability. 36 The members' goal was,
therefore, to have no more than two of these four attributes. 37 Furthermore, because the quintessential nature of the LLC is to provide limited
liability for its members, members were only really left with the ability
to pick up one additional element when structuring their operating

rulings in connection with Wyoming's passage of the first LLC statute in the United
States).
30 See 1 RISTEN & KEATIMNE, supra note 6, §§ 1.04, 3.05, at 1-3, 3-6;
Gazur, supra note 6, at 137; Wat Remedies Should Be Made Available, supra note 6, at 476; Mhat
Standards of Conduct Should Apply, supra note 6, at 36.
31 See Dickerson, supra note 6, at 426.
32 See 61 Fed. Reg. 66,590 (1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3). Effective January 1, 1997, the new Code regulations provide that:
A business entity that is not classified as a corporation... can elect its
classification for federal tax purposes as provided in this section. An eligible entity with at least two members can elect to be classified as either an
association (and thus a corporation...) or a partnership....
Id.
33 See Gazur, supra note 6, at 136; Goforth, supra note 20, at 1210.
34 See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1996) amended by 61 Fed. Reg. 66,589
(1996)
("An unincorporated organization shall not be classified as an association unless such organization has more corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics.").
35 See id. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) amended by 61 Fed. Reg. 66,589 (1996) (defining
"corporate" characteristics as follows: "(i) [aissociates, (ii) an objective to carry on
business and divided [sic] the gains therefrom, (iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization of
management, (v) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property, and (vi) free
transferability of interests").
36 See id. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) amended by 61 Fed. Reg. 66,589 (1996). Characteristics common to both "associations," organizations requiring classification as a corporation for tax purposes, and partnerships do not count when determining whether there are
more corporate characteristics than not. See id. "Associates" and "an objective to carry
on business for joint profit" are common to almost all organizations. See id. § 301.77012(a2) amended by 61 Fed. Reg. 66,589 (1996).
See id. § 301.7701-2. In this manner, the LLC would not have more corporate
than noncorporate traits. See id.

1997]

COMMENT

1029

would expressly eliminate free
Typically, the members
agreement.
39
transferability and continuity of life.
In varying degrees, the current statutory language of LLC laws also
tends to reflect the tax sensitive nature of this entity. Many statutes attempt to devise a structure corresponding to the federal taxation guidelines for "partnership" status. In some instances, the state statutes are
"bulletproof," requiring the members' unanimous consent to prevent dissolution uPon disassociation of one of the members to admit subsequent
members. 1 In this manner, the LLC essentially remained boxed into
compliance with prior Code guidelines; there was no continuity of life
and the members' interests were not freely transferable. 42 Although this
guaranteed tax protection provided security, this rigid structure negatively impacted the parties' ability to structure the agreement to best suit
their needs. 43 Conversely, while "flexible" statutes permit variations on
these restrictions, 44 they demand greater care by the drafters when structuring the agreement. 45

38 See Dickerson, supra note 6, at 441 (noting that the LLC will almost always have

limited liability).
39 See Platner, supra note 28, at 367 (observing that when drafting an LLC operating
agreement most attorneys focus on negating continuity of life and free transferability).
40 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 930.
41 See Martin I. Lubaroff & Paul M. Altman, Delaware Limited Liability Companies,
INsI HrS, Nov. 1992, at 32, 33. "Bulletproof" statutes consist of mandatory provisions,
unalterable by agreement, that guarantee compliance with the federal tax statutes for partnership classification. See id. The other two classifications of statutes are "flexible" and
"bulletproof flexible." See id.; supra notes 44 & 46.
42 See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement that an
LLC must eliminate at least two of the four tax classification characteristics for favorable
"partnership" classification).
43 See 1 RmsTmN & KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 3.05, at 3-7. Ribstein also observes
that many mandatory provisions "freeze" the evolution of tax rules and therefore become
obsolete with any new changes in the tax law. See 1 id.
44 See Lubaroff & Altman, supra note 41, at 33. "Flexible" statutes, in contrast to
"bulletproof' statutes, give greater deference to freedom of contract and allow the parties
to structure their agreement as they see fit. See id. While "flexible" statutes allow the
parties to fashion their own agreement, the risk, of course, is that the parties will draft
provisions that would take the LLC outside of the partnership classification. See id.
45 See 1 RImsTEI & KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 3.05, at 3-6. An error in drafting the
operating agreement concerning tax classification matters could be significant and may
very well fall on the shoulders of the attorney who drafted the agreement. See 1 id.
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The Framework of the New York and Delaware Statutes:
Admission of New Members and Continuation upon Dissolution
1. New York

New York's LLC statute is generally referred to as a "default," or
"bulletproof flexible," statute. 46 This genre of "flexible" statute represents a happy medium between the rigidity of a bulletproof statute and a
statute that provides no safeguards on which to fall back. 47 Here, if the
members fail to reference a particular subject or issue within the operating agreement, the default provisions of the Limited Liability Company
Law prevail. 48 This fallback, however, did not necessarily guarantee favorable tax classification under the old tax law. 49 A default statute is
primarily concerned with alerting parties to a potential issue rather than
providing protection.50 In a non bulletproof statute, two key statutory
provisions are those that govern dissolution of the organization and the
admittance of new members because of the strong link these provisions
have to the tax classification issues: dissolution bears directly on continuity of life, while admittance of new members relates to free transferability.-"
In New York, § 701 governs the dissolution of an LLC. 52 This
provision authorizes the members to elect to continue the LLC when an

46 See Bruce A. Rich & Cheryl Parsons-Reul, Practice Commentaries,
N.Y. LIMwTm
LLABUTY COMPANY LAW, at 4 (McKinney 1997). A "bulletproof flexible", the statute
contains default provisions that protect the parties from stepping outside partnership classification, but which may also be altered by the parties. See Lubaroff & Altman, supra
note 41, at 32, 33. Thus, this genre of statute provides the safety of the bulletproof stat-

utes with the added flexibility of allowing the members to modify the default provisions.
See id.

47 See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 3.05, at 3-7; Lubaroff
& Altman, supra note 41, at 33.
48 See Rich & Parsons-Reul, supra note 46,
at 4.
49 See 1 RiBsTEIN & KEATINCE, supra note 6, § 3.05, at 3-7.
5D See 1 id.
51 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (discussing the partnership classification process under the prior tax law).
52 See N.Y. LITED LIABILrTY COMANY LAW § 701 (McKinney 1997). Section
701

provides:
A limited liability company is dissolved and its affairs shall be wound up

upon the first to occur of the following:
(a) the latest date on which the limited liability company is to dissolve, if any, provided in the articles of organization;
(b) at the time or upon the happening of events specified in the operating agreement;
(c)... the vote or written consent of at least two-thirds in interest
of the members;
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event of dissolution occurs. 53 Prior to 1992, there was still some doubt
regarding whether majority consent to continue would annul the continuity of life trait. 54 Today, however, it is well-settled that a majority continuation provision suffices to eliminate continuity of life.55 Thus, while
flexibility certainly has its benefits, the parties must always keep current
on the progression of these 56
classification issues and be careful to craft
their agreements accordingly.
(d) the bankruptcy, death, dissolution, expulsion, incapacity or
withdrawal of any member... or the occurrence of any such event
specified in the operating agreement... unless within one hundred
eighty days after such event the limited liability company is continued either:
(1) by the vote or written consent of the percentage in interest... stated in the operating agreement; or
(2) if no such percentage is specified in the operating agreement, by the vote or written consent of a majority in interest
Id.

701(d) (emphases added).
See id.
54 See Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability
Company,
41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 387, 447-50 (1991) (discussing some of the private letter rulings and decisions of the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) regarding the uncertainty surrounding this issue).
55 See 1 RIBSTEIN & KATINGE, supra note 6, § 16.14, at 16-44 to -45
(suggesting
that after a 1992 Revenue Ruling concerning limited partnerships, majority consent is
probably sufficient to eliminate continuity of life); BRIAN L. SCHORR, SCHORR ON NEw
YORK LIMITED LIABITY COMPANIES & PARTNmHIPS § 7:01, at 7-2 to -3 (1996)
(commenting that a majority consent provision in a limited partnership agreement will still
annul the continuity of life trait). Pursuant to the I.R.S. Revenue Rulings, this concept
should carry over to LLCs. See id. at 7-3 & n.5. Continuity of life for tax purposes is
defined as follows:
An organization has continuity of life if the death, insanity, bankruptcy,
retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause a dissolution of the organization, or expulsion of any member will cause a dissolution of the organization ....
[C]ontinuity of life does not exist notwithstanding the fact that a dissolution of the limited partnership may be
avoided, upon such an event of withdrawal of a general partners, by the
remaining general partners agreeing to continue the partnership or by at
least a majority in interest of the remaining partnersagreeing to continue

the partnership.
26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(b)(1)

omitted) (emphasis added).

(1996) amended by 61 Fed. Reg. 66,589 (1996) (citation

56 To overcome any doubts regarding the continuation by majority vote,
a dissolution
provision in a New York operating agreement would typically incorporate a unanimity
requirement, as in the following example:
(a) Subject to the provisions of [Section (b)l hereof, the Company shall be
dissolved and its affairs wound up and terminated upon the first to occur of
the following: (i) [specify finite date], unless extended by the [Members];
(i) The determination of the [Members] to dissolve the Company; Ci) A
sale of all or substantially all the assets of the Company; or (iv) An Event
of Withdrawal of a [Member] of the Company.
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Similar to the dissolution provision, the section pertaining to the
admission of new members possesses a majority default, if the members
fail to provide otherwise in their operating agreement, admission of a
new member requires a majority in interest vote.5 7 While there are still
some unresolved issues regarding what constitutes free transferability,
majority consent is generally adequate to protect the LLC from this
trait.58 Oftentimes, however, many parties incorporate a unanimous consent requirement instead of the majority default, perhaps to allay any
fears regarding the unsettled tax classification issues. 59 This mechanism
is also utilized as a control device to ensure that any new member is a
satisfactory associate to the current members.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of [Section (a)] hereof, the occurrence
of an Event of Withdrawal of a [Member] shall not dissolve the Company
if, within 180 days after the occurrence... all of the remaining Members
unanimously agree in writing to continue ....
BF Operating Agreement, supra note 28, at 22-23 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Note, however, that this issue is probably of less concern now that the new Code regulations allow for the election of partnership status. See supra note 32, for a review of the
new regulations.
57 See N.Y. LIMITED LIABIuTY CoMPANY LAW §§ 602, 701 (McKinney 1997). Section 602 provides:
(a) A person becomes a member of a limited liability company on the later
of: (1) the effective date of the initial articles of organization; or (2) the
date as of which the person becomes a member pursuant to this section or
the operating agreement... (b) After the effective date of a limited liability company's initial articles of organization, a person may be admitted as a
member: (1)... if the operating agreement does not so provide, upon the
vote or written consent of a majority in interest of the members....

Id. A 60 2 (emphasis added).

See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 16.09, at 16-33 (suggesting that the
consent of all members is not necessary and that something less, such as majority consent, would suffice in the LLC context). In contrast, Ribstein observes that free transferability exists when the "members owning all or substantially all of the interests in the organization have the power, without the consent of other members, to substitute for
themselves in the same organization a person who is not a member of the organization."
1 id. at 16-32 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1996)). The two unanswered questions on this issue of free transferability are (1) what interests need consent; and (2) what
type of consent is required. See 1 id. at 16-33; see also 1 id. at 16-32 to -35 (discussing
free transferability generally); Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A
Possible Choicefor Doing Business?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 721, 737-40 (1989) (same).
59 See BF Operating Agreement, supra note 28, at 20. A standard New York operating agreement generally contains a provision similar to the following:
no transferee or assignee ... shall be a substitute Member... entitled to
all the rights and benefits under this Agreement of the transferor or assignor of such interest unless and until: (i) the unanimous wriften consent
of the [Members] has been obtained, which consent each [Member] may
withhold in its sole discretion ....
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphases added).
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2. Delaware
6
Delaware, like New York, has a "bulletproof flexible" statute. 0
As of August 1, 1996,61 Delaware has switched to a default of majority
consent for continuation upon dissolution. 62 As noted previously, this
provision should adequately annul the trait of continuity of life. 63 Additionally, title 6, § 18-801(1) mandates a maximum duration of thirty
years unless the parties select another finite term or perpetual life. 64 If
the members fail to provide otherwise, the LLC automatically dissolves
at the end of this thirty-year period. 65 It is important to note, however,
that a fixed duration does not negate the characteristic of continuity of
life; rather, it remains a possible avenue for dissolution. 66 Members
must continue to comply with the tax classification rules regarding continuity of life.

60 See Lubaroff & Altman, supra note 41,
at 33.
61 See 1996 Del. Laws C. 360 (H.B. 528) (changing the requirement from
unanimous

consent to majority consent).
62 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801 (1991 & Supp. 1996).

Title 6, § 18-801

provides, in part:
A limited liability company is dissolved and its affairs shall be wound up
upon the first to occur of the following:
(1) At the time specified in a limited liability company agreement,
which limited liability company agreement may include a provision
for the perpetual existence of the limited liability company, or 30
yearsfrom the date of the formation of the limited liability company
if no such time is set forth in the limited liability company agreement; or the limited liability company does not provide for the perpetual existence of the limited liability company;
(2) Upon the happening of events specified in a limited liability
company agreement;
(3) Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, upon the written consent ofall members;
(4) The death, retirement, resignation, . . of any member... unless the business of the limited liability company is continued (i) within 90 days... either (A) by the vote or written consent of the percentage in interest... stated in the limited liability
company agreement, or (B) if no such percentage is specified in the
limited liability company agreement, by the vote of not less than a
majority in interest of the remaining members ....
Id. (emphases added).
63 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (noting the sufficiency of majority continuation provisions).
64 See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801(1) (Supp. 1996).
65 See id.
66 See Gazur & Goff, supra note 54, at 450 & n.334 ("a fixed period of existence,
however abbreviated, does not vitiate continuity"). In addition, because this merely
states a maximum term, dissolution prior to this term would not be considered in contravention of the agreement. See I RIBSTEIN & KEAINUE, supra note 6, § 11.05, at 11-12.
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Similarly, the Delaware provisions governing admission of new
members protect LLCs against unfriendly tax treatment. 67 Title 6, §§ 18301 and 18-704 prohibit both new members and assignees from gaining
admission to an LLC without unanimous consent, unless the agreement
provides otherwise. 68 Thus, in the event the parties fail to specify anyshields the
thing regarding this issue, the Delaware statute automatically
69
LLC from having the characteristic of free transferability.
The basic framework of the New York and Delaware statutes illustrates the general structure of the two primary provisions relating to past
tax concerns: continuity of life and free-transferability. 7 0 While, prior to
the new Code regulations, it was imperative that the parties addressed
these matters, the issues were more or less perfunctory, which the parties
could handle with minimal inconvenience. 71 As illustrated above, even if
the parties neglect to mention certain issues, both statutes' default language generally provides a safeguard against disfavored classification under the old tax law. 72 Consequently, tax classification matters under the
old tax regulations were procedural details of formation and did not present many challenges if diligently handled.7 3 Today, tax considerations
remain even less of a concern because of the new Code regulations,
which allow for a "check the box" election of partnership status. 7 4 Liability issues, on the other hand, are substantially more difficult to systematize. 75
67 See supra note 58 (reviewing the concept of free transferability).
68 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-301(b) (Supp. 1997) (providing that a when
"a

person who is not an assignee" acquires an interest in the limited liability company, the
person is admitted as a member "upon the consent of all members" (emphasis added));
id. § 18-704(a)(1) (1993) (requiring the "approval of al of the members of the limited
liability company other than the member assigning his limited liability company interest"
(enihasis added)).
See id. §§ 18-301(b), -704(a) (1993 & Supp. 1997); supra note 58 (discussing the

avoidance of free transferability).

70 See supra notes 46-69 and accompanying text (completing a survey of the New

York and Delaware LLC laws).

71 While there is always some uncertainty concerning classification issues, many of

the potential pitfalls of these uncertainties are negated by statutory LLC provisions that

comply with current classification regulations.
6, k3.05, at 3-7.

See 1 RiSTEN & KEAIN E, supra note

73 See supra notes 46-69 and accompanying text.

74 See supra note 71.
See 61 Fed. Reg. 66, 590 (1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-3); supra
note 32.
75 See 1 RIBSTmN & KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 9.01, at 9-1 to -2. The duties and
obligations of the members are generally more fact sensitive and thus more open to potential dispute and varying interpretations. See 1 id. Another impediment is the lack of

case law available to aid in defining the appropriate standards of conduct in the LLC
arena. Policy issues also play a strong role in the manner in which the courts will inter-
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II. LIABILITY ISSUES: How LIMITED IS "LIMITED" UNDER THE NEW
YORK AND DELAWARE LLC STATUTES AND RELATED DECIsIONAL
LAW?

A. A Backdropfor Analysis: The Fiduciary Relationship

In contrast to the procedural character of an LLC's tax structure, liability is largely substantive in nature. 76 Accordingly, it is often the
court's inte retation of the statutory language that defines the parameters

of liability.

The LLC by its very name pronounces the accolades of

"limited liability." This is not, however, a carte blanche designed to
permit the random conduct of members wholly lacking in standards, fiduciary or otherwise; accordingly, limited liability is not entirely limited
in all cases.7 8 The key question then becomes to what extent members
are exposed to personal liability.

In addressing this inquiry, one must first define the fiduciary standards that give rise to the duties of LLC participants. It is here, however, that the true enigma lies. The difficulty rests in attempting to pinpoint exactly how courts will interpret the fiduciary obligations in an
LLC environment. 79 Generally, to unravel a query of this nature, the
typical method of analysis 8would
include a review of the respective state
0
statutes and decisional law.
LLCs, however, present an interesting problem. Because many of
the LLC enabling statutes have only been enacted in the past few years,
courts have not yet had an opportunity to decide any cases pertaining to

pret fiduciary obligations. See What Standards of Conduct Should Apply, supra note 6, at
66. Some of these policy concerns are: (1) flexibility and freedom to contract; (2) some
degree of exactness when defining member/manager duty; (3) promotion of risk taking;
(4) responsible member conduct to other members and to third parties; and (5) responsibiliy to the general public. See id.

6 See I RIBSTEmN & KEATINGE, supra note 6, § 9.01, at 9-1.
77 See 1 id. (recognizing that case law, not statutes, lends a fuller definition
to fiduciary obligation).
See infra notes 217-27 (summarizing some statutory limitations on member/manager conduct).
79 See Howard N. Lefkowitz, Standards of Conduct for Members and Managers:
FiduciaryDuties, in Forming and Using Limited Liability Companies & Limited Partnerships 1994 at 659, 668 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7055,
1994). Lefkowitz suggests that while to some extent, a well-drafted agreement may reduce some of this incertitude, there is always a question as to enforceability. See id. at
668-69.
80 See What Standards of Conduct Should Apply, supra note 6, at 80-81
(proposing
that the judiciary will play a key role in lending definition to the standards of conduct imposed on members/managers of an LLC).
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the fiduciary obligations of the participants. 81 Consequently, two sources
for exploration remain: (1) the LLC statutes; and (2) the decisional law
from the LLCs corporate and partnership primogenitors. These sources,
however, are not perfect because they cannot adequately capture the hybrid nature of an LLC. 82 Depending on the sophistication of the parties
and nature of the agreement, endless possibilities exist for potential
LLCs. 83 Nonetheless, one can formulate a workable methodology by
piecing together some theories from both corporate and partnership law,
as well as reviewing the nature and structure of LLCs.
B. Limited Liability: An Examination of the New York and
Delaware Statutory Provisions
Both the New York Limited Liability Company Law and the Delaware Limited Liability Act restrict the members' ability to shield themselves entirely from personal liability by imposing certain statutory
checks on this privilege. 84 In New York, the members may include a
provision in the operating agreement that eliminates or limits the members' personal liability.8 5 The members may not, however, eliminate liability for bad faith, intentional misconduct, or ill-gotten financial
gains.8 6 The New York law also charges managers with certain mini81

See Elizabeth M. McGeever, HazardousDuty? The Role of the Fiduciary in Non-

corporateStructures, Bus. L. TODAY, Mar./Apr. 1995, at 51, 51 (observing that "where
the ink on many of the enabling statutes is barely dry, courts have yet to decide questions

concerning the existence and scope of fiduciary duties among participants").
82 See supra notes 20-30 (discussing the LLC's corporate and partnership
characteristics).
See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text (illustrating the variety of
structural

formats that participants may select when forming an LLC).
84 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,

ABnITY COMPANY LAw

§§

§

18-1101 (1993 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. LIMITED LI409, 417, 420 (McKinney 1997).

85 See N.Y. LIMITED LIABILIT COMPANY LAW § 417(a) (McKinney 1997). "The op-

erating agreement may set forth a provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of
managers to the limited liability company or its members for damages for any breach of
duty in such capacity...." See id. In addition, § 609(a) of the New York Law provides
that:
[njeither a member of a limited liability company, a manager of a limited
liability company managed by a manager or managers nor an agent of a

limited liability company (including a person having more than one such
capacity) is liable for any debts, obligations or liabilities of the limited liability company or each other, whether arising in tort, contract or otherwise, solely by reason of being such member, manager or agent or acting

(or omitting to act) in such capacities or participating (as an employee,
consultant, contractor or otherwise) in the conduct of the business of the
limited liability company.
Id.

609(a) (emphases added).
See id. § 417(a)(1).
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mum standards of conduct. 87 Section 409(a) of the New York law mandates an objective good faith standard. 88 As a reward for compliance
with this standard, a manager cannot be held liable for any acts or omissions while acting in this capacity. 89 Finally, under § 420, a New York
LLC has the authority to indemnify its members and managers as long as
there is no bad faith or unlawful personal gain involved. 90
The Delaware Act contains even less restrictive language. 91 To
avoid liability for any fiduciary duties imposed in "law or equity," the
statute merely requires "good faith reliance" on the terms of the limited
liability agreement.
This lack of any strict fiduciary standard follows
from Delaware's strong attachment to freedom of contract, an underlying
theme that pervades the Delaware Act. 93 The Act strives to put the terms
and structure of the agreement in the hands of the members, filling in
gaps only when the members fail to specify otherwise. 94 Title 6, § 181101(b) emphasizes this underpinning by expressly stating that the policy
of the Delaware95 Act is to defer to freedom of contract to the maximum
extent possible.

87 See id. § 409(a).
a See id. (requiring managers to "perform [their] duties ..
in good faith and with
that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under
similar circumstances").
89 See id. § 409(c).
90 See id. § 420. Specifically, § 420 reads as follows:
[slubject to the standards and restrictions, if any, set forth in its operating
agreement, a limited liability company may, and shall have the power to,
indemnify and hold harmless, and advance expenses to, any member, manager or other person ....
provided, however, that no indemnification may
be made to or on behalf of any member, manager or other person
if... his or her acts were committed in bad faith or were the result of active and deliberate dishonesty and were material to the cause of action so
adjudicated or... he or she personally gained in fact a financial profit or
other advantage to which he or she was not legally entitled.

Id.

See Letkowitz, supra note 79, at 664.
92 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c)(1) (Supp. 1996).
93 See Lubaroff & Altman, supra note 41, at 32-33 (providing a general examination
of fiduciary duties under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act). Lubaroff and
Altman point out that the "Act's basic approach is to permit members to have the broadest possible discretion in drafting their limited liability company agreements and to furnish
answers only in situations in which the members have not expressly made provision in
their... agreement." See id. at 32; see aLso DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b)
(1993).
See Lubaroff & Altman, supra note 41, at 32.
95 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (1993). Title 6, § 18-1101(b) provides
that the "policy of this chapter [is] to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom
of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements." Id.; see
91
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Accordingly, many Delaware LLC agreements contain strong indemnification and exculpation provisions exonerating the participants
from liability to the LLC and to other participants. 96 Within Delaware,
there exists no express statutory impositions or opt-out provisions that
require managers and members to act within a particular realm of acceptable conduct.
As a result, the LLC agreement defines the scope and
nature of member and manager responsibilities." The Delaware Act also
allows for unlimited indemnification of the members and managers to the
extent provided in the LLC agreement. 99
While seemingly unfettered, the contractual freedom of the Delaware Act is not as absolute as it appears; the mere absence of statutory
standards will not remove an LLC participant from any common-law restraints. 1°0 Additionally, whereas title 6, § 18-1101 appears to give great
deference to freedom of contract principles, title 6, § 18-1104 preserves
the rules of "law and equity." 10 1 Accordingly, member conduct remains
subject to the impositions and restraints of the decisional law-the question is, to what degree.
C. The DecisionalLaw
To attempt to define the scope of liability, one must first define the
applicable standard of conduct. Once molded, this standard dictates acceptable and non-acceptable behavior, liability imposed only on the latter.
An interesting corollary to this concept is, then, to what extent the parties
may alter this common-law standard by contract. In other words, will
the law permit the parties to "opt-out" of a pre-defined standard of duty.
aLso Lubaroff & Altman, supra note 41, at 32-33 (illustrating the contractual flexibility
that the Delaware Act permits in the fiduciary arena).
96 See Lubaroff & Altman, supra note
41, at 32.
97 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1109 (1993 & Supp.
1996). In contrast,
title 8, § 102(b)(7) of Delaware's General Corporation Law entitles the corporation to
eliminate the personal liability of directors. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)

(Supp. 1996). Even this clause, however, contains some limits on the extent to which the
corporation can contract out of liability. See id.The section prohibits the waiver of the
duty of loyalty and good faith, among other things. See id.

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-402, -405 (1993 & Supp. 1996) (providing that
the limited liability company agreement may impose certain penalties on managers who
breach the terms of the agreement).
99 See id.§ 18-108 (1993).
100 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 935-36. The Delaware statutory language, title
6,
§§ 18-1101 and 18-1104 in particular, is ambiguous enough to leave open the question of
whether there is adequate justification for the courts to interfere with the parties' agreement when crafted according to the statutory scheme. See id. In other words, when
should the courts override what is statutorily permissible is left open by the Delaware
statute. See id.
101 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1101, -1104 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
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This issue, in more generalized terms, reflects the tensions between freedom of contract and the court's equitable powers to intervene and modify
the parties' agreement.1 °2 Accordingly, the quintessential dilemma becomes how far the parties 3may go in structuring their agreement without
any judicial interference.
1. General Corporation Law
Because our first task is to construct the basic standard of LLC conduct, it would be helpful to examine the current impositions of the corporation and partnership law in our two sample states. 10 In corporate law,
the two generalized notions of responsibility are the duty of care 0 5 and
the duty of loyalty. 1°6 Courts have traditionally evaluated the duty of
102 In the corporate schematic, there has already been a move towards allowing contract to take a more prevalent role in governing the relationship between the parties. See
Thompson, supra note 4, at 935. Thompson illustrates this concept by referencing the
Delaware Supreme Court case of Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993), where
the court refused to "soften" the corporate statutory scheme by holding that "[ilt would
do violence to normal corporate practice and our corporation law' to fashion a judicial
remedy." Id. at 935 & n.60. The theory behind this reasoning is that the participants in
the corporate form have selected this type of governance by becoming shareholders and

thus this is not something the judiciary should alter. See id. On the flip side, however, is
the argument that the parties have selected the limited liability, and along with this, the
governance rules are imposed upon participants. See id. This has graver implications for
minority shareholders who, of course, will effectively be governed by the majority.

See

id.

103 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 922 (predicting that a key issue in future LLC

cases will be the relationship between the parties' freedom to contract and mandatory

law.

las. See id. at 922-23.

As the courts begin to hear cases involving LLCs, they will be
confronted with many of the same issues that have arisen in context of other business associations, for example the partnership and corporation. See id. at 922. It is thus likely
that much of the new LLC case law will turn out very similar to the partnership and corporation law of the past. See id. at 922-23.
105 See Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the
Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to CorporateDirectors, 57 FORDHAM L. REv.
375, 375-76 (1988). Many state statutes now allow corporations to opt-out of the duty of
care. See id. See generally Harvey Gelb, Director Due Care Liability: An Assessment
of the New Statutes, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 13 (1988) (assessing the soundness of duty of care
opt-out provisions and the extent to which they actually relieve directors of liability).
106 See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984)
(applying New York law); In re Albion Disposal, Inc., 152 B.R. 794, 821-22 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Branson, supra note 105, at 375.
The duty of care incorporates the standard that a fiduciary owes the shareholders
when acting on behalf of the corporation. See Norlin, 744 F.2d at 264. The duty of
loyalty prohibits self-dealing unless the fiduciary can show that the transaction is equitable
and is in the corporation's best interests. See id. When there is self-dealing or a lack of
good faith, the duty of loyalty takes precedence over the duty of care; the director is thus
no longer afforded the protection of the business judgment rule and must prove the fairness of the transaction. See id. at 265.
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care under the business judgment rule, 10 7 whereas both New York and
8
Delaware have codified the duty of loyalty. 1o

As noted above, the duty of care is largely defined by a concept

known as the business judgment rule. 10 9 The general theory behind the
business judgment rule is to maintain managerial freedom and protect
shareholders' interests.' 10 This doctrine has developed primarily because
of the courts' recognition that it is nearly impossible to objectively adjudicate what are in essence business judgments.'
Courts also acknowledge that the judiciary is not the ideal candidate for corporate decisionmaking and, hence, business determinations are best left in the boardroom instead of the courtroom.1 2 Provided director conduct meets certain minimum standards of care, the doctrine prohibits judicial inquiry
into the soundness of a corporate decision. 13
New York and Delaware courts have handled the business judgment
rule in a similar manner.1 4 This doctrine essentially protects directors

from any second-guessing by creating a presumption that they acted ap-

propriately, "appropriate" behavior consisting of informed"

and disin-

107 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.
1985); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). While the business judgment rule is a creature of the
decisional law, New York has codified a general standard of care embodied by an objective reasonableness standard. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
Directors are also entitled to rely on the reports of officers, employees, counsel, and
other professionals as long as the director believes that party to be "reliable and compe-

tent in the matters presented." Id. § 717(a)(1)-(3).

108 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney
1986).
109 See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811.
110 See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811 & n.4. The business judgment rule stems from the

basic axiom that directors manage the affairs of the corporation. See Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d at 872. Title 8, § 141(a) of the Delaware Code and New York's § 701 codify this
essential premise. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §
701 (McKinney 1986). Directors, as managers of the corporation, are charged with
unique fiduciary obligations to the corporation and shareholders. See Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d at 872.
ill See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000
(N.Y. 1979).
112 See id.
113 See id.
In Auerbach, the New York Court of Appeals described this doctrine as
one that "bars judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors taken in good faith and

in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawfid and legitimate furtherance of corporate
Pu oses." Id.

See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1984).
115 The seminal case in Delaware on what constitutes "informed conduct" is Smith v.
Van Gorkom. See 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In Van Gorkom, the issue was whether the
board of directors had arrived at an informed decision regarding the approval of a merger
proposal. See id. at 874. The court, applying a standard of gross negligence, held that
the board failed to reach an "informed business judgment" when they voted to sell the
corporation for $55 per share. See id. The court explained that the directors neglected to
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terested conduct.1 6 Consequently, to rebut this presumption, the opposing party must show that the directors were either self-interested or not
adequately informed.117 If successfully rebutted, the burden of proof
then shifts to the directors to show that the transaction was "fair" to the
corporation-a concept sometimes referred to as the "entire fairness
doctrine."1 8
The duty of loyalty, on the other hand, is codified in both statesunder § 713 of the New York Business Corporation Law and title 8, §
144 of the Delaware Code.119 In general, this duty prohibits self-dealing

take adequate steps to assess the true value of the company. See id. Specifically, the directors approved the transaction without any prior notice of the proposal and after a
meeting that lasted only two hours. See id. at 869, 874. Their decision was based solely
on what one of the directors and officer, Van Gorkom, presented orally at the meeting.
See id. at 874. There was neither written documentation nor any support to substantiate
the valuation as a fair price. See id. The court emphasized that while directors are entitled to rely on reports of officers under title 8, § 141 (e) of the Delaware Code, they are
not entitled to blind reliance. See id. at 874-75. Thus, even though the current market
price was only $38 and the collective experience of the board illustrated a highly sophisticated group of directors, the directors were hailed as neglecting to meet their duty. See
id. This case illustrated, among other things, the willingness of the Delaware courts to
enforce the duty of care as something more than a superfluous standard, and it is thus not
su 1 rising that this duty to be informed was no longer taken lightly. See id.
See Norlin, 744 F.2d at 264-65 (explaining the presumption of appropriate behavior); Stoner v. Walsh, 772 F. Supp. 790, 800-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986) (explaining the
presumption that conduct is informed and in the corporation's best interest); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (same); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (same). In Aronson, the Delaware Supreme Court characterized this baseline for review as a "presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Id. (citations omitted).
Note that under some circumstances, such as a hostile takeover, the Delaware courts
have required an enhanced duty of care. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651
A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995). The Delaware Supreme Court has justified the imposition
of this "enhanced judicial scrutiny test" because of the "'inherent conflict of interest'
during contests for corporate control." Id. (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 82
(Del. 1992) (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954)). In these instances, the burden is on the
directors to establish that (1) they reasonably believed that a threat to the corporation existed; and (2) the defensive action taken was a reasonable course of action relative to the
threat posed. See id.
117 See Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir.
1980)
(applying New York law). Directors must "'account for their actions only when they are
g or fraud, or to have acted in bad faith.'" Id.; Cede
shown to have engaged in self-de
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
118 See, e.g., Crouse-Hind, 634 F.2d at 702; Norlin, 744 F.2d at 264; Cede, 634
A.2d at 361 (explaining the entire fairness doctrine).
119 See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713
(McKinney
1986).
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unless the self-interested relationship was disclosed and approved."' A
self-interested relationship ordinarily involves a situation where a director
is involved on both sides of the transaction.12 1 The intent of the statutory
exemptions is to allow a "limited safe harbor" that prevents the automatic voiding of corporate action merely because of potential board conflicts.1 2 If, however, the director fails to comply with the statutory
mandates of disclosures and approval, the decision of "fairness" reverts
to the courts under the "entire fairness doctrine." 123
Aside from the protection of the business judgment rule, the corporate statutes in both states permit the corporation to "opt-out" of certain
liabilities imposed upon directors.' 24 In New York, § 402(b) of the
Business Corporation Law authorizes inclusion of a provision in the
charter that eliminates or limits the directors' exposure to personal liability, subject to certain non-waiveable restrictions.12 5 Delaware contains a
similar opt-out provision under title 8, § 102(b)(7) of its General Corporation Law.n6
In summary, the corporate landscape embodies fiduciary standards
for corporate governance controlled by statutory guidelines and further
defined by the courts.127 In both jurisdictions, directors are cloaked in a
shield of protection known as the business judgment rule. 12 If the directors meet the prerequisites of this doctrine, courts will not substitute their
judgment for that of the directors.19 If not, however, the courts will
adjudge director conduct by a much more stringent fairness standard.130
Moreover, the corporate statutes provide additional protection to directors by permitting the elimination of liability for breach of fiduciary duty,
subject to certain non-waiveable obligations.'31
12D See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 713 (McKinney

1986).

121 See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.

122 See Cede, 634 A.2d at 365.
123 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 713(b)
(McKinney 1986).

124 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1996); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAw §

402P) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 402(0) (McKinney Supp.
1996).

126 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1996).

See supra Part Il.C. 1 (discussing general corporation
law).
tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 701
(McKinney 1986); supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text (examining the business
127

128 See DEL. CODE ANN.

judgment rule).
S29See,
e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979).
30 See supra note 118 and accompanying
text.

131 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1996); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW

§ 402(b)

(McKinney Supp. 1996).
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As indicated above, the corporate structure affords directors a great
deal of protection, whether through the business judgment rule, the
elimination of fiduciary duties within the charter, or indemnification. 132
Nonetheless, the "close corporation" represents a species of corporate
entity where the common law may displace or limit the liability shields
133
that states typically grant directors in a publicly traded corporation.
Defining the exact specifications of what constitutes a close corporation,
however, is not an easy task.
For instance, there are no mandatory criteria that corporations must
satisfy to be treated as a close corporation, and the states differ in the
formation of a close corporation.
Delaware mandates that the charter
denominate the corporation as a "close corporation" 135 and has a subchapter devoted entirely to close corporations. 136 In contrast, New York
merely includes language in its general corporation law authorizing an
election by the corporation to be managed by shareholders instead of directors. 13 In both states, the shareholders then assume any liabilities
that the directors would have had. 13 Both statutes exclude corporations
that are publicly traded from electing this classification. 139 Thus, these
entities, sometimes referred to as "incorporated partnerships, " 140 typically possess three distinguishing features: (1) few shareholders; (2)
stock that is not traded; and (3) significant management/shareholder
overlap. 14 1 Additionally, restrictions on transferability are likely to be

132 See supra Part II.C.1 (reviewing the corporate decisional law).
133 See Dickerson, supra note 6, at 429.
134 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, §§ 341-356 (1991 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 620 (McKinney 1986).

135 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 343 (1991).
136 See id.§§ 341-356 (1991 & Supp. 1996).

137 See N.Y. Bus. CORP.LAW § 620(b) (McKinney 1986).
138 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(f)
(McKinney 1986).

139 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a)(3); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620(c).

140 See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975); see

also James W. Lovely, Agency Costs, Liquidity, and the Limited Liability Company as an
Alternative to the Close Corporation, 21 STETSON L. REV. 377, 379 (1992); Brent
Nicholson, The Fiduciary Duty of Close Corporation Shareholders: A Call for Legisla-

tion, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 513, 513 (1992).
See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511; see also Nicholson, supra note 140, at 513, 515;
Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close Cor-

poration, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 465 (1985).

Management overlap exists when

shareholders act in a dual capacity as managers thus skewing their independence.

Peeples, supra, at 465.

See
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applied more liberally
in the close corporation than in the regular corpo142

ration context.

In general, courts have imposed a higher set of fiduciary obligations
on the shareholder/directors in this type of environment. 143 Some courts
apply a "heightened fiduciary duty," whereas others apply an "intrinsic

fairness" test, to situations that benefit the majority shareholders at the
cost of the minority shareholders.144 The preeminent close corporation
45
cases defining fiduciary duties come from the Massachusetts courts.1
For example, in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 146 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that shareholders' duties in a close corporation are akin to those in a partnership setting. 147 What the court
deemed a "strict good faith standard" encompassed the Massachusetts
partnership standard of "'utmost good faith and loyalty.'" 1 4
The Donahue court's decision rested upon the unique circumstances
surrounding a minority shareholder's position in a close corporation.14 9
Notably, minority shareholder challenges to board decisions are technically possible, but practically unfeasible. 50 This is primarily due to the
deference that courts grant board decisions under the business judgment
rule.' 5 1 Consequently, decisions involving the declaration of dividends,
142

See J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Validity of "Consent Restraint" on Transfer of

Shares of Close Corporation, 69 A.L.R.3d 1327, 1328-29 (observing that while state
statutes generally permit restrictions on transferability, the likelihood of enforcement is
greater in the close corporation context); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (1991)
(permitting restrictions on transferability in general); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 508(c)
(McKinney 1991) (same).
143 See Nicholson, supra note 140, at 513-15.
14 See id. Nicholson proposes a legislative solution that utilizes "partnership-type
dut[ies]" to define the relationship between the shareholders. See id. at 515. For a discussion of the treatment that various courts have imposed upon majority shareholders in
the close corporation context, see generally Nicholson, supra note 140.
145 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661-63
(Mass. 1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (Mass.
1975). New York appears to follow the trend in Wirkes and Donahue and has recognized
that shareholders in close corporations warrant unique protection from the courts. See,
e.g., Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1331, 1318-19 (N.Y. 1989).
Delaware, on the other hand, has explicitly declined to follow MIrkes, at least in the context of employment contracts. See Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 39 (Del.
1996). Delaware does, however, appear to acknowledge the potential for majority-owed
fiduciary obligations to minority shareholders in general. See id. at 40.
146 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
147 See id. at 515.
149 See id. (citation omitted).
149 See id.
150 See U. at513.
151 See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 513. The court opined that "in practice, the plaintiff
will find difficulty in challenging dividend or employment policies [because] [s]uch policies are considered to be within the judgment of the directors." Id. (footnote omitted).
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payment of exorbitant salaries to the majority, and deprivation of minority participation in the management/employment of the company are not
readily contestable in the judicial arena.' 52 Secondly, many minority
shareholders have significant amounts of capital invested in the enterprise.153 Unlike a publicly traded corporation, however, no open market
exists for these shares where a minority investor can readily cash out his
or her interest.154 While this shareholder may, absent any transfer restrictions, attempt to sell his or her shares to another party, it is unlikely
that any buyer would knowingly step into an oppressive situation.
Thus, without the heightened scrutiny applied in a close corporation
Some commentators and courts have criticized the application of the business judg-

ment rule in the close corporation context. See Peeples, supra note 141, at 465. Peeples
suggests that some of the problems stem from inappropriate justifications and assumptions
surrounding the application of the business judgment rule. See id. at 483-87. In particular, some of the typical justifications for employing this rule, reassuring capable managers, encouraging risk taking and inappropriateness of judicial review, are not applicable
in a close corporation context. See id. at 483. Reassuring owners who are also managers
is unnecessary. See id. Encouraging the owner/managers to take risks by allaying any
fears of liability is also unwarranted; the owners presumably are already cognizant of any
business risk. See id. at 483-84. Finally, concerns that the courts are not qualified to
determine "business decisions" is lessened due to the often less complex issues that arise
in close corporations. See id. at 484.
In addition, Peeples suggests that widespread litigation flooding the courts is also
unlikely due to (1) the smaller number of potential plaintiffs/shareholders; and (2) the lack
of incentive that the shareholders have to bring derivative suits, which would only serve
to benefit the majority shareholders because the proceeds flow back to the corporation.
See id. at 484-85. Peeples further questions the dubious nature of the traditional assumptions inherent in the business judgment rule. See id. at 485-87. One of the standard assumptions involved in the rule's application is the independence of the directors. See id.
at 485. In an environment where the directors are also the shareholders and oftentimes
the employees, however, there will always be the potential for conflict, involving compensation and dividends for example. See id. Another assumption is that of external
controls on management, such as the federal securities laws, which are not present in the
close corporation. See id. at 486. Finally, in the corporation context it is presumed that
there are always alternative remedies available to the dissatisfied shareholder-the shareholder may simply sell his or her shares. See id. at 487. Again, however, this assumption does not hold true in the close corporation where there is no open market for the
shareholders' interest in the corporation. See id.
To remedy these disparities, Peeples completes a comprehensive review of the potential solutions, including statutory and judicial standards, shareholder agreements and
other potential remedies, and concludes by endorsing the "reasonable expectation analysis" as the alternative that is most beneficial to minority shareholders in a close corporation. See id. at 487-509. This approach provides for a statutory remedy of "involuntary
dissolution" where there has been *oppressive conduct." See i0. at 501. Oppressive
conduct is gauged by the "reasonable expectations of the parties: frustration of a party's
reasonable expectations results in 'oppression.'" Id. (footnote omitted).
152 See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 513.
153 See id. at 514.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 515.
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context,
156 minority shareholders would essentially be left without a rem-

edy.

The Donahue standard was further refined in the subsequent Massachusetts case of Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 157 In Milkes,
the court held that the correct measurement for determining compliance
with the "strict good faith" standard was to weigh any legitimate business pu ose with the feasibility of employing a less harmful course of

action.
Here, the court examined the alleged "freeze-out" of a minority shareholder, Wilkes, where the majority refused to allow him to continue his employment as a salaried employee. 159 The court found no legitimate business reason for this refusal because Wilkes was not involved
in any misconduct and had always accomplished his share of the responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. 160 Therefore, the court concluded that
this action was motivated by an attempt to force Wilkes to sell his shares
back to the corporation at an unreasonably low price.161
In summary, close corporations present unique issues and are therefore generally granted special deference by courts deciding shareholder
disputes with management. 162 In particular, courts tend to apply an
overlay of partnership
fiduciary principles rather than the traditional cor163
porate standards.
3. Partnership Law
Another body of law likely to impact future LLC cases is partnership law. The two primary forms of partnerships are the general partnership and the limited partnership. 16 A general partnership can be formed
156 See generally Terry A. O'Neill, Self-Interest and Concernfor Others in the OwnerManaged Firm: A Suggested Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciary Obligation in Close
Corporations, 22 SETON HALL L. REv. 646 (1992) (exploring the option of dissolution in
the close corporation as opposed to the partnership setting).
157 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
158 See id. at 663.
159 See id. at 661. The court noted that the denial of salaried employment may be one
of the most "pernicious" measures that a controlling group may engage in to force a
shareholder out of the corporation, which is known as "freeze-out."
See id. at 662.
Many shareholders in a close corporation rely on this type of active participation and expect to earn most of the benefits through a salaried position. See id.
160 See id. at 663-64.
161 See id. at 664.
162 See supra notes 143-61 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 143-61 and accompanying text.
164 See 1 ALAN R. BROMBERO & LARRY E. RIESTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP § 1.01(b), at 1:7 (1996). A general partnership has one class of members,
general partners, whereas a limited partnership has two classes, general and limited partners. See 1 id. General partners participate in the day-to-day control of the business and
are exposed to personal liability. See 1 id. Limited partners, on the other hand, are im-
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without agreement and even inadvertently, 165 whereas a limited partnership requires filing a certificate with the secretary of state in the appropriate jurisdiction. 66
General partners in general partnerships are liable for the obligations of the partnership and are jointly and severally responsible for the
actions of the other partners. 1 67 Similarly, the general partner or general
partners in a limited partnership are responsible for all partnership obligations. 6 8 In contrast, limited partners are only at risk to the extent of
their investment in the limited partnership. 169 Additionally, the conduct
of general partners,
in both general and limited partnerships, is subject to
70
fiduciary duties. 1
In general, the limited partnership statutes give little guidance as to
what these duties entail. 17 1 Both the New York Revised Limited Partnership Act and the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
merely provide that general partners have the same rights and are subject
to the same restrictions as general partners in a general partnership.
Additionally, Delaware, but not New York, expressly allows indemnification clauses in the limited partnership agreement. 3 Partnership law,
as the mechanism for characterizing the attributes of non-statutory business associations, such as the general partnership, is thus pertinent to delineating the role of general partners in a limited partnership setting.
Partnership duties, including the fiduciary relationship, have historically originated from the common law. 17 4 Other sources of authority
emerge from the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), adopted by most
mune from personal liability, but are also generally precluded from any active management in the business. See 1 id.
165 See Dickerson, supra note 6, at 424.

While inadvertent general partnerships can

be created by the actions of the parties, for example, by agreement to share in the profits
and losses of a particular deal, the majority of general partnerships are formed by written
agreement. See McNally & Small, supra note 14, at 27.
166 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-201 (1993) (requiring the filing of a certificate of
limited partnership); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 121-201 (McKinney Supp. 1997) (same).
167 See McNally & Small, supra note 14, at 27.
168 See id. at 28.
169 See id.
10 See id. at 27, 28; infra notes 174-202 and accompanying text (discussing partner

fiduciary duties).
171 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-403 (1993 & Supp. 1996); N.Y.
PARTNERSHIP
LAW § 121-403 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
172 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-403 (1993 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. PARTNERSHP
LAW § 121-403 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
173 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-108 (1993).
174 See Caryl B. Welborn, Avoiding PersonalLiability to Co-Members, Partnersand
Third Parties: How Far Can the Partnershipor Operating Agreement Go?, in Partnerships Revisited: New Rules, New Entities, Old Issues, New Sections 323, 325 (ALIABA Course of Study, June 18, 1996).
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states, and the relatively new Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(RUPA), which by contrast has not been well-received.175 The UPA defers primarily to the common law for fixing the limits of relational obligations among partners. 176 RUPA,
on the other hand, furnishes substan177

tially more statutory guidance.

Section 404 of RUPA, entitled "General Standards of Partner's
Conduct," specifically delineates the scope of the partner's fiduciary duties. 178 Like the corporation statutes, the two duties that section 404 incorporates are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 179 RUPA also
175

See id. As of August 1995, only three states had enacted a version of RUPA. See

Dickerson, supra note 6, at 435 & n.70. For a review of the Delaware and New York
laws see infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
17e See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT (1914) (UPA) § 21, 6 U.L.A. 608 (1995). This
section provides only that
[elvery partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or
liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property.
Id. Despite the absence of express definition in the UPA, courts and commentators have
implied a "fiduciary relationship" between partners. See Welborn, supra note 174, at
326. Included among these implicit relationship-based obligations are that of loyalty and
care, such as forbidding the use of partnership assets for individual benefits, prohibiting
competition with the partnership, taking advantage of opportunities that belong to the
partnership, improper usage of confidential information, and grossly negligent or bad
faith conduct. See id.
177 See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT (1994) (RUPA) § 404, 6 U.L.A. 58-59 (1995). For
a
discussion of the revision of partnership law and the development and contributions of
RUPA, including fiduciary obligations, see generally Donald J. Weidner, A Perspective
to Reconsider PartnershipLaw, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1988); Donald J. Weidner,
The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct Midstream: Major Policy Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L.
REv. 825 (1990) and Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Partners#ip Act: The Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus. LAw. 1 (1993).
175 See RUPA § 404, 6 U.L.A. 58-59.
179 See id. Subsection (b) defines the duty of loyalty to the partnership and other partners as limited to the following:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property,
profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of
the partnership business or derived from a use by the partner of partnership property, including the appropriation of a partnership opportunity;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding
up of the partnership business as or on behalf of a party having an interest
adverse to the partnership; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the
partnership business before the dissolution of the partnership.
Id. § 404(b), 6 U.L.A. 58.
Subsection (c) defines the duty of care as follows:
A partner's duty of care to the partnership and the other partners in the
conduct and winding up of the partnership business is limited to refraining
from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of the law.
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restricts the extent to which these relational duties may be limited or
waived. 180 For example, while the partners may not eliminate the duty of
loyalty, they may redefine their obligations as long as the limitations are
not "manifestly unreasonable." 18 RUPA also forbids any "unreasonable
reduction" of the duty of care 82 and any "manifestly unreasonable" alteration of the standards by which the good faith and fair dealing standard
are adjudged. 83
In addition to the UPA and RUPA, both New York and Delaware
have codified partnership laws.18 4 Neither, however, gives much additional guidance relative to the fiduciary duties of the parties.18 5 Similar
to the UPA, these statutes leave the work of molding these duties to the
courts. 18 6 Specifically, § 43 of the New York law echoes section 21 of
the UPA by merely laying out a general foundation; the title, "Partner
18 7
accountable as a fiduciary," is perhaps more telling than the content.
Delaware offers even less by not expressly stating any fiduciary obliga-

Id. § 404(c), 6 U.L.A. 58. Section 404 also demands that the partners perform their duties "consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing." Id. § 404(d), 6
U.L.A. 58. Finally, section 404(e) provides that there is no violation of the RUPA
.merely because the partner's conduct furthers the partner's own interest." Id. § 404(e),
6 U.L.A. 58.
150 See id.§ 103, 6 U.L.A. 16-17.
1s1 See id. § 103(b)(3), 6 U.L.A. 16.
182 See id. § 103(b)(4), 6 U.L.A. 17.
183 See id. § 103(b)(5), 6 U.L.A. 17.

See generally Robert M. Phillips, Comment,

Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, 64 U. COLO.
L. RE'. 1179 (1993) (examining the concept of good faith and fair dealing in the context
of RUPA).
184 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1501-1544 (1974 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §§ 1-126 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1997).
185 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1501-1544 (1974 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §§ 1-126 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1997).
186 See UPA § 21, 6 U.L.A. 608 (1995) (indicating that common law is generally
responsible for fixing the limits of fiduciary duties); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1505 (1993);
N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 43 (McKinney 1988); supra note 176 (discussing UPA section
2
See N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §§ 5, 43 (McKinney 1988). A portion of § 43 reads
as follows:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or
liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property.
Id. § 43(1).
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tions."1 8 As in the LLC statute,"' Delaware's title 6, § 190
1505 defers to
the "rules of law and equity" for any definitional purpose.
In light of the absence of statutory detail, partnership case law is the
191
primary source for defining the relational obligations of partners.

Whatever the UPA and the state statutes may lack in detailing these responsibilities, Meinhard v. Salmon, 192 a New York Court of Appeals
case, defines with grandeur. In this seminal case, Judge Cardozo eloquently delineates the partner's role as fiduciary as including a strict duty
of loyalty. 193 More recent New York cases continue to reinforce the
venerability of these fiduciary obligations. 194 The New York Court of
Appeals, in Birnbaum v. Birnbaum,'" continued to fortify the unyielding
concept of the fiduciary's duty of undivided loyalty. 196 Generally, in defining the scope of these responsibilities, the courts have emphasized that
fiduciaries may not involve themselves in situations where
1 97 their personal

interests may impair their obligations to the partnership.

188 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1501-1547 (1993 & Supp. 1996) (making
no men-

tion whatsoever of any express fiduciary obligations).
189 See id. § 18-1101(c)(Supp. 1996).
190 See id. § 1505 (1993).
New York contains an identical provision.

See N.Y.

PARTNERSHiP LAW § 5 (McKinney 1988).
191 See Welborn, supra note 174, at 325. The same general partnership
principles
apply equally to general partners in a limited partnership setting. See Riviera Congress
Assocs. v. Yassky, 223 N.E.2d 876, 879 (N.Y. 1966).
192 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
193 See id. at 546. This oft-cited passage reads as follows:
Joint adventures, like co-partners, owe to one another, while the enterprise
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to
those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. Not honestly alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there
has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of
particular exceptions.
Id.*(citation omitted).
See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989); Lichtyger v.
Franchard Corp., 223 N.E.2d 869, 874 (N.Y. 1966); Drucker v. Mige Assocs. II, 639
N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (App. Div. 1996).
195 539 N.E.2d 574 (N.Y. 1989).
196 See id. at 576. In particular, the court stated that "it is elemental that a fiduciary
owes a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to those whose interests the fiduciary is to
protect. This is a sensitive and 'inflexible' rule of fidelity .... [The fiduciary] is bound
to single-mindedly pursue the interests of those to whom a duty of loyalty is owed....
Id.1citations omitted).
See, e.g., id. (finding that a partner's payments to his wife of partnership funds as
compensation conflicted with his duty as a fiduciary); Drucker, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 366
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The Delaware courts have given similar deference to the partners'
status as "fiduciaries." 198 As the Delaware chancery court stressed, "[a]
fiduciary duty is not a simple moralism; it supplies an important component of the utility of any form of organization that promotes capital aggregation from many sources."'" The court went on to state that the
formidable purpose of imposing fiduciary duties was to balance the interests of the investors with those of the managers, who need to be able to
manage with a good deal of discretion. 2°° The fiduciary duty of loyalty
superimposes upon the partners a general standard of conduct. 201 The
primary goal of this common-law duty is to prevent the need for unwarranted and unnecessarily detailed contracting, including circumstances
that are foreseeable and those that are not.20 2

m. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS

IN AN

LLC SEiTING: A NEW

STANDARD

A. Setting a Frameworkfor Review: A StructuralRecap of the
LLC
As noted above, LLCs are a cross-breed of the partnership and corporate forms, falling somewhere in the middle of the two. 20 3 The fiduciary obligations will also lie along the lines of this spectrum-the question
is where should their placement be, and perhaps more importantly,

(finding that the use of voting provision under the partnership agreement for personal
gain constituted a breach of fiduciary duty).
98 See, e.g., In re USACafes, 600 A.2d 43, 48-49 (Del. Ch. 1991) (holding that fiduciary obligations are imposed upon the directors of a corporate general partner); US
W., Inc. v. Time Warner Inc., No. CIV.A.14555, 1996 WL 307445, at *20-21 (Del. Ch.
June 6, 1996) (holding that a fiduciary duty imposes an obligation to act in good faith to
advance the beneficiary's interests); Davenport Group MG, L.P. v. Strategic Inv. Partners, Inc., 685 A.2d 715, 720 (Del. Ch. 1996) (holding that general partners are subject

to requirements of common-law fiduciary duties); James River-Pennington Inc. v. CRSS
Capital, Inc., No. CIV.A.13870, 1995 WL 106554, at *11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 1995)
(holding a general partner accountable as a fiduciary to the partners and the partnership).
See generally Bradford P. Weirick, Fduciary of Delaware Directors in a Limited Partnership Context, 5 INSIGHTS 11, Nov. 1991, at 29 (discussing US4Cafes and the potential

expansion of fiduciary duties in a partnership to its corporate directors).
See US W., Inc., 1996 WL 307445 at *21.

2W See id. (emphasizing the need to "safeguard[ ] investors in placing funds in the
hands of others for indefinite periods, without contracted for returns, and in delegating to
managers very broad and flexible discretion").

21see id.
2M See id.
20 See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text (examining the general characteristics of LLCs).
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whether it should be fixed or flexible. 2 4 To respond to this inquiry, it
would be helpful to review the nature of this new entity and the manner
in which New York, Delaware, and the ULLCA have addressed some of
the issues surrounding fiduciary obligations and waiver.
How do parties form an LLC, why do parties chose this form, what
type of bargaining process is available to the parties, how much of their
investment is at risk, and how easy is it for a dissatisfied participant to
exit from the LLC? To form an LLC, the parties must file a certificate
of formation with the appropriate state office, 20s thus precluding any inadvertent formation, as there sometimes is in a general partnership setting. 2°6 Accordingly, members knowingly become part of the LLC.
This point is not to be overstated, however, as most parties are generally
aware of becoming part of an entity-general partnership or otherwise.
The choice of the LLC format is primarily generated by two guiding
forces: limited liability for all members and partnership taxation treatment. 2 °W By having limited liability, the amount of investment at risk is
only the members' investment in the LLC, not the members' personal assets. 208 The key benefit of the LLC, however, is combining limited liability and partnership taxation with the flexibility to structure and operate the LLC as the members desire. 209 Accordingly, the ability of parties
to bargain and participate in the active management of the LLC will depend largely on the structure of each individual LLC.
An LLC can function in many different ways. 2 10 The parties may
chose to have the members run the LLC, much as a general partnership

W4 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 922-23 (suggesting that the LLC case law will
evolve to mimic the corporation and partnership case law, resulting in a "judicial taming
of this new beast").

X5 See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201 (a) (1993 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. LIMrED
LLABuITY COMPANY LAW § 203(d) (McKinney 1997).
W6 See Dickerson, supra note 6, at 419.

W7 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 929. LLCs are driven by limited liability and fa-

vorable tax treatment, but not by form of governance. See id. As articulated by the
Prefatory Note to the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, "[tihe allure of the limited
liability company is its unique ability to bring together in a single business organization
the best features of all other business forms-properly structured, its owners obtain both
a corporate-styled liability shield and the pass-through tax benefits of a partnership."
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. AcT (1995) (ULLCA), 6A U.L.A. 426 prefatory note (1995 &

Sun. 1996).
See Dickerson, supra note 6, at 419 ('[the LLC] provides limited liability for its
owners without concern for the extent of their involvement in management").

2W See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

210 See MeGeever, supra note 81, at 54 (observing that LLCs can be member or man-

ager managed).
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works. 2 1 Alternatively, the LLC could be managed by a board of managers elected by the members, similar to the corporate structure. 212 Finally, the LLC could opt for a structure where there is a managing member or members who control(s) the day-to-day operations of the LLC
with the remainder of the members having only limited decision-making
authority, much like a limited partnership.
The potential permutations
of this chameleon-like beast are therefore highly relevant factors when
attempting to formulate a workable standard for defining fiduciary duties
and the freedom to opt-out of these obligations.
Finally, not unlike many other business forms, with the exception of
a publicly traded entity, the operating agreement may restrict or prohibit
a member from withdrawing from the LLC until dissolution. 2 14 Moreover, there may be a lesser degree 2of
self-help available to members who
are "locked-in" to the association. 1 5
B. Statutory Construction: Flexible v. Mandatory Standards
As illustrated in Part II of this Comment, there are diverse approaches to the statutory definition of fiduciary duties. 2 16 The New York
Limited Liability Company Law demands "good faith" performance in
accordance with a reasonable person standard 217 and requires the members to adopt a written operating agreement. 2 1s Although the agreement
may limit participants' personal liability for breach of their fiduciary duties, it may not eliminate breaches for bad faith conduct. 21 9

211 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1996); N.Y.
LIMITED LIABIuTY
COMPANY LAW § 401(a) (McKinney 1997).
212 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1996); N.Y. LIMITED LIABnI-Y

COMPANY LAW § 408(a) (McKinney 1997).
213

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1996); N.Y. LIMED LIABIUTY

COMPANY LAW § 408(a) (McKinney 1997).
214 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-603 (Supp. 1996); N.Y. LMITED LIABI.ITY
COMPANY LAW § 606 (McKinney 1997).
215 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 936.

One important consideration in the LLC

context is the lack of self-help available to the members. See id. As opposed to the partnership forum, where all general partners are restrained by liability to the other partners
and the partnership, LLC members are not. See id. Thus, there is arguably more justification for judicial interference in the limited liability context, than in the partnership settinA where the partners can more or less police themselves. See id.
See supra PartII.
217 See N.Y. LIMITED LIABIlITY COMPANY LAW § 409(a) (McKinney 1997) (mandating
that a participant act in "good faith and with that degree of care that an ordinary prudent
person in a like position would use under similar circumstances").
215 See id. § 417(a).
219 See id. § 417(a)(1).
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The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, on the other hand,
sets forth a very narrow mandatory standard of conduct. 2no For a member to be free from liability, the member is obligated only to rely in good
faith on the terms of the LLC agreement. 221 The Delaware Act emphasizes freedom of contract, giving maximum effect to the enforceability of

the parties' agreement.=m Accordingly, the Delaware Act affords parties
the authority to expand or restrict any duties that 23may be imposed upon
the members, presumably under the common law.
Apart from the New York Law and Delaware Act, there is another
approach to structuring fiduciary duties, which has been adopted by the
ULLCA.'
In a unique twist, the ULLCA stands in stark contrast to
both the New York Law and Delaware Act by borrowing the methodology of RUPA in structuring its layout of fiduciary responsibilities. '
Almost verbatim from RUPA, the ULLCA section 409 enumerates explicit standards by which participants must abide.2 26 Nonetheless, this
22D See DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (Supp. 1996); see also J. Dennis Hynes,
Fduciary Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry into Freedom of Contract, LAW & CONTiw.
PitOBS., Spring 1995, at 29, 49-50 (commenting on an identical provision in the Delaware
Limited Partnership Law). Hynes suggests that:
This narrows the reach of the good faith standard, which is confined to in-

terpreting the parties' contract.

Also, Delaware courts have required 'a

tortious state of mind' to show a breach of good faith under the statute.
This could be read to incorporate a standard of 'honesty in fact,' on the
reasoning that a tortious state of mind means a fraudulent state of mind.
This reading is reinforced by the philosophy of the statutory language,
which is to narrow, not expand, liability.
Id. at 50 (footnotes omitted). He goes on to state that this language is "particularly striking" in a limited partnership act, as opposed to a general partnership act, because of the
relative remedial options available. See id. Limited partners "do not exercise control
and do not enjoy dissociation or dissolution powers," increasing the potential for abuse
and exploitation by the general partner(s). Id.
221 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (Supp. 1996).
M2 See id. § 18-1101(b) (1993).
M See id. § 18-1101(c) (Supp. 1996).
224 See ULLCA § 409, 6A U.L.A. 464-65 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
225 Compare id.(enumerating explicit standards of conduct from members) with DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (1993 & Supp. 1996) and N.Y. LIMrTED LLABIUTY
COMPANY LAW §§ 409, 417 (McKinney 1997) (expressing vague standards of conduct for

members).

26 Compare ULLCA § 409, 6A U.L.A. 464-65 with RUPA § 404, 6 U.L.A. 58-59
(1995). Section 409 of the ULLCA reads as follows:
(a) The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to a member-managed company and its other members are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care im-

posed by subsections (b) and (c).
(b) A member's duty of loyalty to a member-managed company and its
other members is limited to thefoIlowing:
(1)to account to the company and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit derived by the member in the conduct or
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predefined regimen may be tailored by agreement; the ULLCA section
103 includes an "opt-out" provision that essentially permits the members
to reduce their obligations to a minimal threshold of good faith. 227
The imposition of mandatory fiduciary duties, such as those in
ULLCA sections 409 and 103, has generated a fair amount of criticism
from commentators-at least in the context of RUPA sections 404 and

winding up of the company's business or derived from a use by the
member of the company's property, including the appropriation of a
company's opportunity;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the company in the conduct or
winding up of the company's business as or on behalf of a party
having an interest adverse to the company; and

(3) to refrain from competing with the company in the conduct of
the company's business before the dissolution of the company.
(c) A member's duty of care to the a member-managed company and its
other members in the conduct and winding up of the company's business is
limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of the law.
(d) A member shall discharge the duties to a member-managed company
and its other members under this [Act) or under the operating agreement
and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and

fair dealing.
)'In a manager-managed company:
(1) a member who is not also a manager owes no duties to the company or to the other members solely by reason of being a member;
(2) a manager is held to the same standards of conduct prescribed
for in subsection (b) through (f).
Id. § 409, 6A U.L.A. 464-65 (emphases added) (alteration in original). The difference in
standards for member-managed LLCs and manager-managed LLCs in subsection (h) has
been questioned. See Dickerson, supra note 6, at 437-38. For the relevant text of RUPA
§ 404, see supra note 179.
m See ULLCA § 103(b), 6A U.L.A. 434-35. Section 103(b) reads as follows:
The operating agreement may not: ...
(2) eliminate the duty of loyalty.., but the agreement may
(i) identify specific types or categories of activities that do
not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable;...
(3) unreasonably reduce the duty of care...;
(4) eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing... but
the operating agreement may determine the standards by which the
performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards are
not manifestly unreasonable ....
Id. See generally Dickerson, supra note 6 (criticizing and commenting on the manner in
which the ULLCA addresses fiduciary responsilbilities); Hynes, supra note 220
(reviewing RUPA opt-out counter-part to the ULLCA provision). C. Donald J. Weidner, RUPA and Fuduciary Duty: The Texture of Relationship, LAw & CONTEmP. PROBS.,
Spring 1995, at 81 (endorsing mandatory minimum fiduciary standards).
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103. 2=8 One argument is that, by employing mandatory fiduciary standards, RUPA precludes certain types of otherwise reasonable contractual
arrangements. 229 One commentator, Professor Larry Ribstein, illustrates
this point by suggesting that a partner may have such a substantial investment in the partnership or LLC that the parties may eliminate any
duty of care obligation. 23 0 From a cost-benefit standpoint, this opt-out is
perfectly reasonable in light of the low risk of breach, i.e., grossly negligent conduct, and the potentially high cost of litigation. 23 1

Professor Ribstein and other commentators also suggest that these
mandatory restrictions on opting-out fail to recognize that many parties to
these agreements are highly sophisticated; they bargain in detail and often
have competent legal counsel by their side. 232 Proponents of the RUPA
language, however, claim that mandatory duties are necessary
to protect
3
the unsophisticated participants and inadvertent partners.1
A second issue of debate arises from the lack of forseeability of a
copartner's future conduct. 234 Proponents assert that mandatory fiduciary
duties protect partners from this type of unforeseeable and perhaps oppressive behavior. 35 As another commentator aptly notes, however, this
uncertainty can "cut[ ] both ways." 236 A prime reason for avoiding fiduciary duties may be to escape the perhaps more risky uncertainties of
228 See, e.g., Hynes, supra note 220, at 39-45; Larry E. Ribstein,
The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct: Not Ready for Prime Tune, Bus. LAW., Nov. 1993, at 45, 58-60

(1993).

See Ribstein, supra note 228, at
58.
230 See id.
231 See id. Other examples include: (1) contracting out of liability for the vague ter-

minology of "intentional misconduct" or a "knowing violation of the law;" (2) certain
self-interested transactions (partnership entering into agreement with a partner's management company); and (3) incorporating a with or without cause expulsion provision. See
id.
2n See id. at 58-59; see also Hynes, supra note 220, at 39-40. Hynes is
a proponent
of eliminating the restriction on waiveability. See id. He submits that "[p]ersons entering
into a partnership relationship ordinarily bargain from an approximately equal position,
an equality created by the fact that each party typically has something of near-equal value
to offer the other. That is the reason partnership status is being offered by one party and
sought by the other." Id. at 40. Hynes also offers an interesting study of cases decided
prior to the enactment of the RUPA where the courts gave great deference to the parties'
agreement, including waivers of fiduciary responsibility. See id. at 40-43. He then
questions whether these cases would stand under the RUPA provisions. See id. at 42.
233 See Hynes, supra note 220, at 45. The Comments to RUPA also
purport to include the waiver restrictions for the benefit of those who lack either "unequal bargaining
power, information, or sophistication." See Ribstein, supra note 228, at 58 (citing RUPA
§ 103 cmt. 2).
234 See Hynes, supra note 220, at 44-45; Ribstein, supra note 228, at 59-60.
M5 See Hynes, supra note 220, at 44; Ribstein, supra note 228, at 59.
236 See Hynes, supra note 220, at 44.

1997]

COMMENT

1057

litigation and of the court's interpretation of the agreement.237 Some
additional disputes pertaining to waiver restrictions concern the agency
relationship between partners/members and the simplification of the contracting process.2 3s
C. A New Frameworkfor Analysis: The Unconscionability
Doctrine
After examining this panoply of statutory methodology, spanning
from Delaware's complete endorsement of freedom of contract to the
ULLCA's somewhat restrictive and more rigid structure, 23 9 the most difficult task is at hand. What, if any, fiduciary responsibilities should the
statutes and/or the courts impose upon the participants in an LLCI
This query entails the quintessential battle between the touchstone of private ordering and the fundamental principles of equity. 2A1 When should
judicial interference be permitted and to what degree should a statute
dictate the norms by which the parties wish to conduct their enterprise?
Freedom of contract is a venerable axiom of contract law. 242 Absent
fraud, duress, or another reason to doubt the parties' consent, the courts
will enforce a party's bargain; this is a fundamental notion, which, if unduly tampered with, could cause great instability. 243 Courts and commentators have nonetheless recognized certain instances where judicial
interference is warranted. 2 "4 First, there are the notions of good faith

237 See id. at 44-45; see also Ribstein, supra note 228, at 59-60 (proffering that the
alternative, disallowing certain waivers, essentially forces the parties into costly legal
situations that could have otherwise been avoided).
2M See Hynes, supra note 220, at 43-45. Proponents of restricting waivers argue
that
agency generates the implicit recognition of fiduciary responsibility. See id. at 43-44.
Because of agency's deference to freedom of contract principles, however, there is also a
good argument that these duties may be contracted away. See id. Additionally, the proponents maintain that mandatory duties foreclose the need to complete a comprehensive
investigation of all potential partners. See id at 44. This too may be an unnecessary concern as a default would allow the parties to investigate as needed. See id.
239 See discussion supra notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
2Ao See Thompson, supra note 4, at 922 ("From a governance standpoint, a key question is the relationship between mandatory law and private ordering, a question that has
long been at the center of corporate law." (footnote omitted)).
See generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REv.
1209 (1995) (examining the contractarian and non-contractarian views regarding whether
fiduciary duties should be mandatory or default rules and how the parties should proceed
if waiveable).
242 See Hynes, supra note 220, at 38.
U13See id. (suggesting that "[miandatory provisions are inconsistent with the bargain
principle" and only serve to hamper the reliability of agreements (footnote omitted)).
2" See infra notes 256-66 and accompanying text. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1982) (maintaining
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and fair dealing, threshold requirements delineating the parties' relations. 5 These may be implied in the contracted-for exchange or imposed as a societal prerequisite for dealing. 24 Next, and perhaps more
intrusive, are doctrines permitting judicial tampering with an agreement
that would otherwise be enforceable-predominately accomplished by a
mechanism known as unconscionability.
Good faith and fair dealing are difficult standards to capture and are
best looked upon as expressing implicit expectations of the parties. 2 U In
other words, what would the parties expect from one another under the
circumstances. Most likely, one would expect that each party is looking
out for his or her own interests but would deal "fairly" with one another.
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) is probably the best guide to
this somewhat elusive concept. 249 U.C.C. section 1-203 demands that the
parties act in good faith in the performance of their duties. 250 The official comments explain that good faith is not a separate duty, but rather
functions as an overlay to the parties' performance; 2 51 it is a context in
which the courts will judge whether the parties have breached an independent duty. 252 For merchants and non-merchants, the U.C.C. imposes
divergent standards: for non-merchants all that is required is "honesty in
fact," a subjective standard, whereas merchants must comply with the
additional requirement of "reasonable commercial
standards of fair deal2 3
ing in the trade," a more objective standard. 5
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also imposes a mandatory
good faith standard. 25 4 The Restatement's comments add further detail to
this concept, interpreting good faith as the type of behavior the other
party would expect in light of the prevailing standards in the community.255
that unconscionability may warrant certain limitations on the fundamental notion that
contracts- "bargain promises"-should be enforced).

245 See infra notes 248-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
concepts.

246 See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 205 cmt. a (1981) (explaining
that
good faith embodies "faithfulness to a common purpose and consistency with the justified
expectations of the other party... exclud[ing] ... bad faith because [it] violate[s] com-

munity standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness").

See infra notes 265-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of unconscionabilSee RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt.
a (1981).
§ 1-203, 1A U.L.A. 109 (1989) (defining

249 See UNIP. COMMERCIAL CODE (U.C.C.)

-good faith-).
See id.
251 See id. official ctmts.
252

See id.

253 See id. official cmts.; id. §§ 2-103(1)(b), 1-201(19), 1 U.L.A. 65, 185
(1989).
254 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
255 See id. § 205 cmt.
a.
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There are, nonetheless, some valid criticisms of limiting statutory
constraints to a good faith standard. 25 6 Good faith, without more, does
not embody any fiduciary responsibilities, such as the duties of care and
loyalty.2 s7 One of the key differences between the fiduciary duty principle and good faith is the ability of the participant to act in a selfinterested fashion. 258 Good faith is a flexible overlay to the parties'
agreement, whereas the concept of a fiduciary responsibility embodies a
moralistic tradition of loyalty.2 59 A fiduciary can never act contrary to
the entity's interests; to do so would inherently conflict with the very
nature of this relationship. 26° Thus, mandatory fiduciary duties necessarily preclude any self-interested activity while good faith obligations do

not.
The trouble with the non-existence of fiduciary restraints is the potential for oppression of minority members or passive investors. 2 2 Some
commentators caution that without some type of due care standard, permissible self-interest and competition with the LLC would lead to abuse
by some participants.20 By itself, a "good faith and fair dealing" standard is probably not sufficient to properly balance the equation. Highl
structured fiduciary statutory restraints, however, are not the answer.
Default fiduciary provisions or common-law fiduciary duties coupled
with a tempered judicial restraint, such as unconscionabiity, is a far superior mechanism for balancing private ordering and concerns of abuse.
M See infra notes 257-63 and accompanying text.
27 See What Standards of Conduct Should Apply, supra note 6, at 73-74.
258 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/EnablingBalance in CorporateLaw: An
Fsay on the JudicialRole, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1618, 1658 (1989). For a comparison of
fiduciary duties and good faith, see generally Coffee, supra. Professor Coffee notes that
one of die central differences is that "a contracting party may seek to advance his own
interests in good faith while a fiduciary may not." Id.
259 See 1 RiBSTmN & KEATINaE, supra note 6, § 9.07, at 9-19 (distinguishing good
faith from the duty of loyalty).
260 See Coffee, supra note 258, at 1658 (explaining that the "traditional fiduciary ethic
insists that the fiduciary act selflessly" (footnote omitted)).
261 See id.; Wat Standards of Conduct Should Apply, supra note 6, at 73-74.
262 See What Standardsof Conduct Should Apply, supra note 6, at
74.
263 See &d. Miller comments that even with closely defined fiduciary duties and a good
faith standard, it is questionable whether these "carefully circumscribed standards," as in
the ULLCA, will be adequate to protect against minority abuse. See id. at 73.
2& See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 258, at 1659. Professor Coffee, under the auspices
of corporate duties, sets forth a viable placement of the fiduciary notion by raising the
query of whether the "mandatory minimum in corporate law [should] be set at or near the
level of the duty of good faith with the fuller, more selfless requirements of traditional
fiduciary duty being treated as default rules." Id. In this manner, a certain degree of
opting-out would be legitimate. See id. In other words, "the zone between the duty of
good faith and the higher fiduciary standard of selflessness would become negotiable."
Id.
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While concepts such as "good faith and fair dealing" are currently
embodied in a fiduciary analysis of LLC members, the unconscionability
doctrine is not.2 Nevertheless, this precept may be a plausible mechanism to police member/manager misconduct in an LLC.?6 By setting
unconscionability as a standard for review, intrusive judicial conduct will
be minimized, giving maximum deference to the parties' agreement,
while preserving some degree of permissive temperance by the courts if
the actions of the parties stretch too far.
The best analysis of unconscionability is again derived from the
U.C.C.2 7 The U.C.C. sets forth the standard for unconscionability in
section 2-302, whichzpermits the court to strike all or part of any unconscionable agreement.
In general terms, unconscionability encompasses
either oppressive terms in the contract itself or disparity in the bargaining
environment. 269 Nevertheless, unlike many merchant/consumer situations
that arise under the U.C.C., it is unlikely that there will be any procedural or substantive unsoundness in the LLC arena because of its commercial context, primarily because the parties will be on or near equal

265 See supra notes 217, 226, 227 ('ilustrating the use of "good faith"
in the statutes).
266 See Hynes, supra note 220 at 50-54. One commentator has suggested replacing

the "manifestly unreasonable" language of section 103 of the ULLCA, which limits the
extent to which the parties may modify the duty of loyalty and obligations of good faith
and fair dealing, with an "unconscionability" standard. See id. The author suggests that
there is more evolved case law surrounding the "unconscionability" concept and that
there is more "bite," or as he terms it 'shock value," to this precept. See id. at 51-53.
A higher threshold thus aids in preserving the "bargain principle," giving more effect to
theiarties' agreement. See id. at 53.
See U.C.C. § 2-302, IA U.L.A. 15-16 (1989).
See id. Section 2-302 reads as follows:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2)... mhe parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.
Id.
W9 See JAMEs J. WHrT & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIPORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-3,
at 137 (4th ed. 1995).
The two measures of unconscionability are typically termed
"procedural" and "substantive."
See id. A contract is procedurally unconscionable
when there is a defect in the formation, for example disparity of bargaining power or lack

of meaningful choice of one party. See id. Substantive unconscionability deals with the
actual substantive terms of the agreement itself, whether the terms are extremely onesided or oppressive. See id. Although there is no definitive answer from the decisional
law, most courts generally mandate a showing under both prongs to support a finding of
unconscionability under section 2-302 of the U.C.C. See id. § 4-7, at 150.
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270
Most future members of an LLC will have
footing in the negotiations.
relatively equal bargaining power and will bargain in detail over the
terms of the agreement. 27 '
Unconscionability would, however, provide courts with a mechanism for policing those instances where the parties were not sophisticated
or where one party had substantially more bargaining power than the
other.2 t2 This judicial tool should allay the fears of those who endorse
mandatory fiduciary duties, as in RUPA and the ULLCA language cited
above, for just this reason. Nevertheless, unconscionability should not
be interpreted as a carte blanche for judicial interference into any contractual imbalance. 273 A bad bargain is not enough to rise to the level of
unconscionability; nor is mere unreasonableness. 274 There is nothing

270 See Johnson v. John Deere Co., 306 N.W.2d 231, 238 (S.D. 1981) (proffering that
the courts are substantially more likely to uphold a U.C.C. § 2-302 challenge "in the case
of the downtrodden consumer than they are in the case of the commercial consumer who
presumably has a far more meaningful choice"); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 269, §
4-9, at 155 ("courts have not generally been solicitous of business persons in the name of
unconscionability"); id. n.2 (citing cases where courts refused to find unconscionability in
commercial settings). For a general discussion of unconscionability in commercial settins, see WHTE & SUMMERS, supra § 4-9, at 155-59.
See generally Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering rtthin Partnership, 41
U.
MIAMI L. REv. 425 (1987) (exploring the bargaining concept in the partnership context).
M Unconscionability is a question of law, and hence this would not be an issue delegated to the fact-finder. See Jones Distrib. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 943 F.
Supp. 1445, 1460 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Potomac Plaza Terraces, Inc. v. QSC Prods., Inc.,
868 F. Supp. 346, 353 (D.D.C. 1994); Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1996).
2n See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965). The Wdliams court noted that courts generally view unconscionability as including an absence of meaningful choice by one party and terms unreasonably favorable to
the other. See id. at 449. The court further explained that meaningful choice is determined by considering all the circumstances. See id. The court noted that a meaningful
choice can be overcome by a gross inequality of the parties' bargaining power. See id.
The Williams court further described the unconscionability as follows:
Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of
it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or
were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by
deceptive sale practices? Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without
full knowledge of its terms might be held to assume the risk that he has
entered a one-sided bargain. But when a party of little bargaining power,
and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract
with little or no objective knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his
consent or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given
to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of the agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and the court should
consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement
should be withheld.
Id. at 449-50 (footnotes omitted).
274 A bad bargain in itself would not necessarily imply substantively unconscionable
terms. To qualify as such, the contract would have to be one that "no sensible man
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wrong with a party attempting to maximize his or her benefits and protections in the agreement, maybe to the detriment of the other. Freedom
of contract should be given great deference. The more intelligent and
crafty party should not be penalized for his or her business savvy, nor
should the less wise be protected and guaranteed a "fair" agreement with
equal benefit to both parties. It is not the courts' prerogative to reform
all agreements where one party benefits more than the other or even
where one party struck a bad deal.
Thus, with the added protection of unconscionability, there is no
reason why future LLC statutes should not grant parties complete freedom to structure their agreement as they see fit. A dissatisfied participant in an LLC is exposed to less potential harm than in other business
associations. Unlike in a general partnership, a party's risk is limited to
the amount of his or her investment. 2 5 Additionally, the parties knowingly enter into an LLC relationship and should carefully consider the
restrictions prior to doing so. The court's function should not be to protect a member from making a bad investment or from his or her inability
to easily exit the LLC, especially where the operating agreement expressly sets forth any restrictions on transferability and other issues in
great detail.
IV. CONCLUSION

The most plausible alternative for developing LLC relational duties
would combine traditional fiduciary concepts with contractual freedoms.
Legislatures should keep any statutory restraints to a minimum. Statutory interference should be limited to a good faith and fair dealing standard and, if desired, default fiduciary duties of care and loyalty or minimal statutory obligations.
Moreover, the courts will surely develop some form of common-law
fiduciary duties once they begin to hear cases involving LLCs. These fiduciary obligations will most likely embody the concepts of the partnership and close corporation, probably somewhere between the heightened
standard of care found in the close corporation context but with more
flexibility to opt-out. Nonetheless, depending on the potential diversity
of management structures that an LLC may subsume, the courts may end
up taking a case-by-case approach.
Any case-by-case approach would, however, run the risk of injecting a good deal of uncertainty into the LLC arena. Thus, it would be
preferable that any minimum statutory standards, such as gross negliwould make and... no honest and fair man would accept." Martin Rispens & Son v.
Hall Farms, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1078, 1087 (Ind. 1993) (citations omitted).
275 See Dickerson, supra note 6, at 419.

1997]

1063

COMMENT

gence, fraud, or unlawful activity, be expressly defined in the statute. In
this manner, there would be greater predictability and the participants
would know beforehand to what obligations they were committing themselves. This course is often preferable in a business context when it is
desirable to know the risks and obligations up front to make an informed
decision on participation and on potential exposure to liability.
In no event should any relational provisions regarding duties of care
and loyalty be non-waiveable, with perhaps the exception of certain
minimal standards. While a mandatory good faith standard does not create any undue interference with beneficial private ordering, any mandatory fiduciary obligations would unduly infringe upon the traditional notions of freedom of contract. Good faith merely provides an innocuous
backdrop for judging performance, but fiduciary standards actually provide a separate duty of performance. As in Delaware, the enabling law
and the courts should give maximum effect to the parties' agreement,
thus precluding the undesirability of non-waiveable performance obligations.7 6
Any egregious behavior relating to the participants' contract and any
corresponding opt-out provisions should be tempered only by the doctrine
of unconscionability. As one commentator astutely remarked, 2P]udicial
activism is [a] necessary complement to contractual freedom."
Here,
the courts would be given certain latitude to invalidate any fiduciary
waivers in the event the agreement of the parties was unconscionable at
the time of formation. Unconscionability would provide a mechanism
whereby any great disparities in bargaining power, leading to potentially
oppressive conduct, could be tempered by the courts. This doctrine,
along with a subset of minimal performance obligations, would create an
ideal balance between private ordering and judicial oversight.
Kathleen D. Fuentes

276 See supra notes 92 and 95 and accompanying text.
277 See Coffee, supra note 258, at 1621.

